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DOUBLE JEOPARDY-SUPREME COURT
DENIES RELEVANCE OF HUNG
COUNTS TO COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL, EXPANDS DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE TO APPLY WITHIN A
SINGLE PROCEEDING
Jessica Greenwood*
N Yeager v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court expounded upon
the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause
recognized as inherent to the Fifth Amendment in Ashe v. Swenson.'
In particular, the Court resolved a circuit split by holding that hung
counts should not be considered when determining the preclusive effect
of acquittals returned under the same indictment. 2 The Court in Yeager
also arrived at the related conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause as
interpreted by Ashe has the potential to bar retrial of hung counts.3 Al-
though the Court in Yeager thus reinvented the Double Jeopardy Clause,
its analysis did not rise to such a momentous occasion, as it relied not
only on circular logic but also serious misreadings of precedent.4
Beginning in October 1998, F. Scott Yeager served as Senior Vice Pres-
ident of Strategic Development for Enron Broadband Services, a tele-
communications division of Enron Corporation.5 In this capacity, Yeager
personally contributed to Enron's efforts to develop a telecommunica-
tions system dubbed the Enron Intelligent Network (EIN).6 From mid-
1999 until early 2000, Enron repeatedly praised the EIN in press releases,
describing the network as operational and technologically advanced.7 In
addition to these public statements, Enron employees-including Ye-
ager-allegedly made a number of laudatory comments about the EIN at
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1. Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2362-63 (2009), rev'g 521 F.3d 367 (5th
Cir. 2008); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970).
2. Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2365, 2368.
3. Id. at 2370.
4. See id. at 2368, 2370.





a conference held for equity analysts in January 2000.8 Two days later,
Yeager sold 100,000 shares of Enron stock at $18 a share above their pre-
conference price; this sale and later transactions earned Yeager a per-
sonal profit in excess of $19 million.9 Contrary to Enron's claims, the EIN
proved unworkable and was "never fully developed."10
In November 2004, the United States indicted Yeager on 126 total
counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud, securities
fraud, wire fraud, insider trading, and money laundering." After a
lengthy trial, the jury acquitted Yeager of each fraud and conspiracy
count but deadlocked on the remaining counts of insider trading and
money laundering. 12 On November 9, 2005, Yeager was re-indicted on
thirteen of these hung counts, and he moved to dismiss under the collat-
eral estoppel doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 3 Yeager argued
that the jury in acquitting him must have decided that he did not possess
material, non-public information about Enron's technology system.14 Be-
cause the government would have to disprove this very issue in his retrial
for insider trading and money laundering, Yeager argued that the govern-
ment was barred from proceeding against him on these counts.' 5
After examining the evidence and arguments presented at trial, the dis-
trict court rejected Yeager's position and found that "the most realistic,
rational, and practical" basis for his acquittals was the finding that he did
not "participate in a scheme to defraud" the public.16 In the course of this
analysis, the court noted that if the jury had decided that Yeager lacked
material, non-public information, it should have acquitted him on the in-
sider trading counts too.' 7 Because the jury acquitted Yeager by deciding
an issue that need not be raised in his retrial, the government could freely
proceed against him.' 8 On review, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ultimately affirmed the trial court's denial of Yeager's motion to dismiss
but found that his argument would have prevailed were it not for the
logical inconsistency identified by the district court and made apparent by
the hung insider trading counts. 19 Because this inconsistency left the
court of appeals unable to ascertain what issues the jury necessarily de-
cided at trial, it held that Yeager's acquittals-and, for that matter, any





12. Id. at 2364.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. United States v. Yeager, 446 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2006), aff'd, 521 F.3d
367 (5th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009).
16. Id. at 735.
17. Id.
18. Id. The government was, however, barred from contesting Yeager's non-participa-
tion in the original scheme. Id. at 737.
19. United States v. Yeager, 521 F.3d 367, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2008), affg 446 F. Supp. 2d
719 (S.D. Tex. 2006), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009).
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could not preclude rehearing of the hung count under Ashe v. Swenson.20
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the legal issues raised by
Yeager's case.21
The Double Jeopardy Clause mandates that "[n]o person shall . . . be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the "same offence." 22 Interpret-
ing this Clause, the Supreme Court has held that it protects a defendant
from a second trial if he was previously convicted or acquitted of the
same offense, but it does not bar further proceedings if the first trial re-
sulted in a hung jury or involved a different offense. 23 In Ashe v. Swen-
son, the Court expanded this traditional understanding of the Clause by
identifying a collateral estoppel "ingredient" therein; under Ashe, the
government is now prohibited from trying a defendant when an essential
element of the offense charged was necessarily decided in the defendant's
favor in an earlier prosecution for another offense. 24
After Ashe, a circuit split developed as to whether the presence of hung
counts should be considered when determining what issues the jury nec-
essarily decided in its acquittals; if not considered, an acquittal could po-
tentially bar rehearing of a hung count with common factual elements. 25
Without guidance from Ashe,26 some circuits found that hung counts
should not be treated as a factor in the collateral estoppel analysis be-
cause they represent nothing more than a jury's indecision. 27 By contrast,
other circuits treated hung counts as relevant and thus properly consid-
ered under Ashe because their existence tends to disprove the claim that
certain issues were decided in the defendant's favor in acquitted counts;
were it otherwise, the hung counts would have been acquittals.28
In Yeager v. United States, the Supreme Court settled this circuit split
by reaching the questionable decision that hung counts should not be
considered as part of the collateral estoppel analysis.29 According to the
20. Id. at 379-81. In this context, the defendant bears the burden of proving which
issues were necessarily decided in his favor. Id. at 380.
21. Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2365 (2009), rev'g 521 F.3d 367 (5th Cir.
2008). The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to Jeffrey Skilling, another En-
ron executive-turned-defendant. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 393, 393 (2009) (grant-
ing certiorari).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. United States v. Randenbush, 33 U.S. (1 Pet.) 288, 290 (1834); United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). The Clause does not prevent retrial of a hung
count, as a mistrial is a non-event which does not cease the jeopardy faced by a defendant.
United States v. Richardson, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1984).
24. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1970).
25. Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2365.
26. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 (finding that the defendant's acquittal for armed robbery
precluded the government from charging him with armed robbery of another victim of the
same incident because the only conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was the defen-
dant's participation in the crime). The Ashe Court had no opportunity to address how
collateral estoppel applies in the case of partial acquittals because it dealt only with an
acquittal under a single-count indictment. See id. at 445 n.10.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Ohayon, 483 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Howe, 538 F.3d 820, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Romeo, 114 F.3d 141, 145 (9th Cir. 1997) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
29. See Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2368.
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Court, examining hung counts in this context undermines the finality of
acquittals by requiring a court to look past the acquittals themselves
when determining what issues they necessarily decided. 30 In deciding to
reverse and remand Yeager's case for further proceedings, the Court also
made explicitly clear that, under Ashe, acquittals have the potential to bar
retrial of hung counts when they share factual elements.31
Before addressing how the Double Jeopardy Clause should apply in
Yeager, the Court first demonstrated that a retrial of the defendant would
violate the Clause by causing him to be "twice put in jeopardy" for the
"same offence." 32 At this point, however, the Court hit a logical snag;
jeopardy traditionally has been terminated only by an acquittal or a con-
viction in a prior proceeding. 33 Acknowledging this problem early in its
analysis, the Court asserted that the public interest in preserving the fi-
nality of acquittals mandates that we "look beyond" the fact that a defen-
dant facing retrial on a hung count must be placed "in jeopardy 'twice"'
for the Double Jeopardy Clause to be implicated. 34 In the very next
clause, however, the Court belied this claim by implying-without sup-
port-that Yeager would in fact face jeopardy twice if he was retried for
insider trading because the "jury's acquittals unquestionably terminated
petitioner's jeopardy with respect to the issues finally decided in those
counts." 35 Having thus argued that the first requirement of Double Jeop-
ardy was both inconsequential and satisfied in Yeager, the Court pro-
ceeded by asserting that Ashe allows it to treat insider trading and fraud
as the "same offence" for Double Jeopardy purposes. 36 As the Court ex-
plained, Ashe clearly established that the Double Jeopardy Clause pre-
cluded prosecution of a given offense when a material element thereof
was an issue necessarily decided in the defendant's favor in a "prior
trial."37 Presumably, therefore, Ashe stood for the proposition that when
an acquittal on one offense decides a particular issue in the defendant's
favor, any offense with that issue as an element may be treated as the
"same offence" under the Double Jeopardy Clause.38 Under the factual
assumptions adopted by the Court, insider trading and fraud thus could
be treated as the "same offence."39
After concluding that the facts in Yeager triggered the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, the Court turned to the legal issues at the heart of the case
and quickly disposed of the notion that hung counts can negate or alter
the preclusive effect of an acquittal under Ashe.40 The Court stated that
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2368-70.
32. Id. at 2366 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
33. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
34. Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2366.
35. Id. at 2365.
36. Id. at 2366-67.
37. Id. at 2366-67, 2368 n.6 (emphasis added).
38. See id. at 2366-67.
39. See id. at 2366.
40. See id. at 2367-69.
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because mistried counts are mere non-events, an acquittal accompanied
by a hung count should be treated precisely as an acquittal returned
alone. 41 The Yeager Court further held that hung counts are irrelevant to
the collateral estoppel analysis under Ashe.4 2 While Ashe instructed the
courts to consider the "record of the prior proceeding" and "other rele-
vant matter" when deciding which issues were necessarily decided in an
acquittal, the Court found that hung counts are neither relevant nor part
of the record, as are "the pleadings, the jury charge, or the evidence." 4 3
As such, the Court concluded that the presence of hung counts does not
impact the collateral estoppel analysis set forth under Ashe.44
In dissent, Justices Scalia and Alito demonstrated the many shortfalls
in the majority's logic. To begin, Justice Scalia criticized the Court's appli-
cation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the case of a partial verdict.
Because Richardson v. United States has long established that the retrial
of a hung count merely prolongs the original proceedings against a defen-
dant, while Ashe held only that issues decided during "a prior proceed-
ing" may preclude subsequent trials, Justice Scalia found no justification
for using the Double Jeopardy Clause to prevent the proceedings in Ye-
ager from continuing to completion. 45 Justice Scalia likewise rejected the
Court's unsupported conclusion that acquittals terminate the jeopardy
faced by a defendant "with respect to the issues" they necessarily de-
cided; jeopardy has classically started and ended "charge by charge, not
issue by issue." 4 6 Finally, Justice Scalia noted that the public interest in
preserving the finality of judgments is hardly served by the Court's deci-
sion because when the jury returns acquittals inconsistent with hung
counts, it fails to carry through its factual determinations to finality.47 JUS-
tice Alito joined Justice Scalia in his dissent but penned his own to em-
phasize the extremely high burden faced by the defendant who asserts
that an acquittal-whether returned in a prior proceeding or alongside a
hung count-has preclusive effect; the defendant will succeed in foreclos-
ing further litigation of an issue under Ashe only if he can establish that a
jury returned a verdict in his favor and would have been "irrational" in so
doing without also deciding that issue in his favor.4 8
The Court's holding in Yeager that hung counts are irrelevant to the
collateral estoppel analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause fails for
lack of support, circular logic, and misuse of precedent.4 9 For instance,
the Court opened its analysis by making the unprecedented statement
41. Id. at 2367.
42. Id. at 2367-68.
43. Id. (using principles of ejusdem generis and the definition of "record" in Black's
Law Dictionary to reach this conclusion).
44. See id. at 2367.
45. Id. at 2372-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S.
317, 325 (1984)).
46. See id. at 2373.
47. Id. at 2374.
48. Id. at 2374-75 (Alito, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 2368, 2370.
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that an acquittal terminates a defendant's jeopardy as to the issues de-
cided therein.50 As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, this conclusion flies
in the face of long-established precedent.5 ' More importantly, however,
the Court attempted to support its conclusion by engaging in revisionist
history. Paraphrasing the Ashe holding, the majority substituted the orig-
inal term "prior proceeding" with "prior trial," so that rehearing of a
hung count would fall "squarely" within binding precedent. 52 The Court
also relied on the holding in Ashe as the only support for its own conclu-
sion that hung counts should not affect the analysis established in that
case.53 Given that any discussion of the partial verdict situation in Ashe
would have been mere dicta, this tactic is unconvincing. Finally, the Court
departed from the very case it so heavily relied upon by ignoring Ashe's
mandate that the collateral estoppel analysis should be "set in a practical
frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceed-
ings."54 Although hung counts may not seem "relevant" or part of the
"record" when technically analyzed using principles of ejusdem generis or
Black's Law Dictionary, it is axiomatic that a hung count constitutes a
relevant brick in the wall which ultimately forms the foundation of a
jury's verdict. 55
The Court's decision in Yeager has a number of troubling implications,
two of which Justice Scalia addressed in dissent. First, extending Ashe to
apply in the case of partial verdicts forces courts to engage in prolonged
and difficult examinations of the record far more often than in the past.56
Second, this increased flow at the trial level will burden the higher courts
with interlocutory appeals and petitions for certiorari.57 Furthermore,
Yeager promotes judicial inefficiency by discouraging prosecutors from
simultaneously pursuing all possible charges against a defendant; the
prosecutor who delays prosecution on a factually related charge may
avoid Yeager's holding in the case of an acquittal by manipulating the
facts so that the same issues are not raised in second prosecution as were
decided in the acquittal.
In Yeager v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court drastically ex-
panded the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause by finding that the ap-
plication of issue preclusion under Ashe v. Swenson is left unchanged by
the presence of mistried counts; as such, the Clause may now apply within
a single prosecution. Despite the importance of this holding, the Court's
analysis is weak at best, as it repeatedly draws conclusions without con-
crete support and, at times, improperly manipulates and departs from the
precedent it cites. All in all, the Court hangs its hat on the public policy
50. Id. at 2366 (majority opinion); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970).
51. See Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2372 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 2366-67 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 2367.
54. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444.
55. See Yeager, 129 S. Ct. at 2367-68.




interest of preserving the finality of acquittals. Although the policies un-
derlying the Double Jeopardy Clause are only arguably implicated in the
case of partial verdicts, the overwhelming weight of authority dictates
that the Clause itself has no application in the case of a retrial because
the defendant in this situation has faced jeopardy not twice, but once.
250 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
